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Introduction 
 
Writing in the immediate aftermath of the plane crashes into the twin towers of the 
World Trade Centre, on September 11, 2001, Ulrich Beck proclaimed that: 
 
‘the gulf between the world of those who profit from globalization and the world 
of those who feel threatened by it has been closed.  Helping those who have been 
excluded is no longer a humanitarian task.  It is in the West’s own interests:  the 
key to its security.  The West can no longer ignore the black holes of collapsed 
states and situations of despair’.1  
 
Following 9/11, these fragile and failed states have been seen by western governments as 
islands of instability from which issue a plethora of security threats. A ‘chronic lack of state 
capacity, political fragmentation, collapsed public infrastructure and social isolation’ are said 
to lead to zones of ‘bad governance, nonexistent social services, and poverty’ which provide a 
‘broader enabling environment’ leading to ‘support and sanctuary’ for terrorists ‘in vast areas 
that have not experienced the political and economic benefits of globalization’.2   The veracity 
of this link is certainly challenged, but regardless of whether or not there is actually an 
empirical link between terrorism, poverty/inequality and these islands of instability, it is the 
argument of this paper that policy makers have adopted this discursive framing to order and 
manage these perceived risks.  However, in contrast to claims that the adopted policy framing 
and related practices constitute a radical rupture or paradigm shift, it is argued here, instead, 
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that they represent a process of incrementalist policy making in which the linkage made 
between human development and state stability has been further expanded.  
In order to advance this argument, the paper draws upon the broader International 
Relations literature that identifies two competing perspectives of risk – Beck’s World Risk 
Society and Foucault’s governmentality of risk.3 The World Risk Society approach introduces 
a dichotomy between reflective and reflexive modernisation.4  The former is associated with 
the first phase of modernity and involves ‘improving our knowledge of cause-effect relations 
and control of the world’.5 Whereas the latter is associated with self-confrontation and an 
acceptance of ‘our own inability to know’. 6  The former attempts to reduce potential 
vulnerabilities through improved scientific technical knowledge, while the latter involves an 
appreciation of the uncontrollable risks that lead to catastrophic events; prompting full 
recognition of the unknowability of the future effects of our current activities.7  Politically, it is 
argued, that such catastrophes prompt a shift to a ‘cosmopolitan form of statehood’ – an alliance 
of the state and civic movements - that will tame global capital.8 
In contrast, a Foucauldian approach emphasises the way in which a variety of risk 
rationalities and technologies are used to manage such challenges. There is thus a 
fundamental difference between this and the World Risk Society approach because it views 
risk as a way of ‘organizing reality, disciplining the future, taming chance and rationalizing 
individual conduct’.9  Rather than leading to a process of self-confrontation through which 
the foundations of modernity are questioned, such challenges are met by new rationalities 
and technologies of risk.10 For this approach, reflexivity refers to the ‘governmentalization of 
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government’ or ‘reflexive government’.11 Instead of witnessing a shift towards a cosmopolitan 
risk society, crises and catastrophes are said to produce reflexive moments through which the 
existing risk dispositif – the ‘discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, 
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions’– adopted by state and non-state actors to govern and manage our natural and 
social environments, are modified to meet the challenges that confront us, thereby sustaining 
the ‘authority of their authority’.12  
Mapping the changes in the discourses and practices adopted by western states for 
engaging with weak and failed states and poverty/inequality reveals a degree of reflexivity 
and incremental reform, but it remains limited and falls far short of Beck’s notion of a 
cosmopolitan society. Certainly, weak and failed states’ association with international 
terrorism has not induced a reversal of neoliberal policy.13   Within this process of incremental 
transformation, the politics of intervention and the securitization of development have been 
extended to encompass the problem of international terrorism.  Indeed, the securitisation of 
development itself is an instance of bricolage whereby two pre-existing policy areas have 
become inextricably connected in response to pressing concerns over state instability, further 
underscoring that the inclusion of terrorism is simply the latest incremental change within a 
proactive set of policies intended to reduce the overall level of risk, rather than a purported 
paradigm shift as others claim.14 
This process of incremental reform and bricolage modifying the risk dispositif has 
involved three overlapping phases: intervention (involving the redefinition of sovereignty), 
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prevention (involving the securitisation of development; and extension (involving the 
incorporation of terrorism within the securitisation of development).   In a post Cold War 
world, the new policy of intervention has involved not only a shift in emphasis from Chapter 
VI to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but also proactive deployments in potential conflict 
zones. This policy of proactive intervention with regard to fragile states was not only 
expanded, it also conjoined development and security: the former regarded as a preventative 
policy to ensure the latter. This securitisation of development was further extended to 
terrorism under the assumptions that terrorism is linked to poverty/inequality and also that 
weak/fragile states provide fertile ground for terrorist movements.  
Previous studies applying both World Risk Society and Foucauldian approaches to 
risk and security have addressed the strategic and policy impact of the new emphasis on 
precaution and pre-emption as a result of 9/11 and other terrorist acts.15  Precaution ‘implies 
that, from now on, along with what one can learn from science, in a context that is always 
relative, it will also be necessary to take into account what one might only imagine, doubt, 
presume, or fear’.16  It therefore involves ‘the deployment of imagination and its coupling 
with possibility of harms that cannot be tolerated....[it has] a fundamentally preventive logic. 
It assumes that prevention is possible’. 17  As such, adopting this principle often requires 
preventative or ‘weatherman’ policies identifying potential dangers and attempting to reduce 
the probability of them turning into actual threats by acting in advance of the event.18  
This paper adds to this literature by arguing that the shift towards a precautionary 
approach with respect to the risks perceived to emanate from failed states and associated 
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with poverty/inequality has placed especial emphasis on preventative policies. Although 
analysis of pre-emptive policies emphasise that action is taken under conditions of 
uncertainty, it is our contention that this does not necessarily distinguish such policies from 
preventative ones. Rather, we should distinguish the two temporally. Pre-emption focuses on 
imminent crises, attempting to identify the emergence of an event and nipping things in the 
bud.19  Whereas preventative policies are viewed as having a longer time horizon ‘confronting 
factors that are likely to contribute to the development of a threat before it has had the chance 
to become imminent’.20 
  In order to develop these points, the remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  
First, it critically compares the competing Beckian and Foucauldian accounts of risk, 
establishing the basis of the argument that risk has been deployed as a means of ordering and 
managing the challenges associated with weak and failing states and poverty/inequality.  
Second, it maps the incremental expansion and reform of the risk dispositif according to three 
overlapping phases which we have termed intervention, prevention and extension. Finally, it 
concludes that although these phases are reflexive moments, whereby policy is reformed 
incrementally and by processes of bricolage, this constitutes a strengthening of the prevailing 
rationalities and technologies of risk, rather than a radical rupture in the discourse and 
practices of risk associated with an emerging World Risk Society and cosmopolitan form of 
statehood.   
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Unbounded Risks, Reflexivity and Prevention 
  
In his works, Beck distinguishes between a first phase of modernity in which 
‘calculating risks is part of the master narrative’ and a later modernity in which we ‘enter a 
world of uncontrollable risk’. 21  Classic modernity involves the application of scientific-
technical knowledge to industrial society, not only endeavouring to calculate the risks 
associated with such actions but also employing an infinite iterative knowledge loop – 
continually learning from problems that arise and applying that new knowledge to further 
improve control over the environment and society.  However, late modernity is increasingly 
beset by risks of a much greater magnitude and scope arising from the unforeseen 
consequences of applying our scientific-technical knowledge to the natural and social worlds.  
Risks become ‘de-bounded’, ‘not limited by political borders or calculable timeframes’ and 
are said to be of ‘low probability but potentially cataclysmic’.22  
In this regard, Beck’s work contains important insights with regard to risk, 
globalisation and security.  The high degree of interdependency that comes with globalisation 
means, not only that risks are de-localized and temporally stretched, but also that ‘assignment 
of causes and consequences is no longer possible with any degree of reliability’.23  For Beck 
too, under such conditions of radical uncertainty, the precautionary principle holds.24  In 
addition, Beck identifies the way in which states have responded to the risks of global 
terrorism by constructing ‘transnational cooperative networks’, and understanding that it is 
in the ‘West’s own interest: the key to its security’ to improve the lot of others.25  Beck 
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suggests that the enormity of these risks will inevitably generate sufficient awareness within 
global society to prompt such critical self-reflection on our existing practices.26 This critical 
reflection – or reflexivity- is said to involve self-confrontation ‘with the effects of risk society 
that cannot be dealt with and assimilated in the system of industrial society’ and an 
acceptance of ‘our own inability to know’ the unintended consequences of our own actions.27  
Reflexive modernisation thus goes beyond simply ‘improving our knowledge of cause-effect 
relations and control of the world’ and actually involves ‘a process of reflection by which the 
foundations of modernity are questioned and revised’.28  This shift, it is argued, prompts a 
major political movement towards what Beck calls a ‘Cosmopolitan form of statehood’ in which 
an alliance of the state and civic movements is forged to confront the issues that arise from 
such risks.29 
Although Beck does suggest that there are other policy outcomes, he argues that the 
nature of the global risks confronting us is acting as a ‘compulsive force’ driving us towards 
cosmopolitan statehood, which is a ‘facet of world risk society’.30 This is because in a world 
risk society, the traditional nationally based solutions are no longer feasible because, ‘instead 
of solving problems, it contributes to producing and exacerbating them’.31 It is argued by 
Beck that the cosmopolitan solution is likely to succeed precisely because it proposes a 
realistic solution to today’s problems.32 At times he goes even further. For example, in the 
aftermath of 9/11 Beck argued that ‘The following paradoxical principle holds true: States 
must de-nationalise and trans-nationalise themselves for the sake of their own national 
interest, that is, relinquish sovereignty, in order, in a globalised world, to deal with their 
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national problems’.33 Most recently, Beck has argued that we are already witnessing the 
emergence of ‘cosmopolitanized risk collectivities’ that may act as a stepping stone towards 
cosmopolitan statehood.34   
In the aftermath of 9/11, a period of political reflection did indeed follow.  However, 
although certain economic reforms were suggested this period of introspection did not 
resemble Beck’s process of societal self-critique.35  Certainly, there is little evidence that such 
an event has produced a ‘cosmopolitan form of statehood’ – that will tame global capital, or push 
societies ‘to make border-transcending new beginnings’ towards a more cosmopolitan 
world.36   Similarly, although there has been a shift away from the minimum state towards an 
emphasis on state capacity, the other fundamental principles of neo-liberalism remain intact, 
namely, free markets, free trade and the free flow of capital.37   
 Instead, when confronted by cataclysmic events, this paper argues that policy follows 
a far more pragmatic path such that reflexivity takes the form of ‘governmentalization of 
government’ or ‘reflexive government’ whereby ‘the mechanisms of government themselves 
are subject to problematization, scrutiny and reformation’. 38  A Foucauldian approach 
therefore emphasises the way in which a variety of risk rationalities and technologies are 
used to order and manage such challenges.  Rather than a radical shift towards cosmopolitan 
statehood, the risk dispositif has, as one of its main objects, the reduction of risk to the 
circulation of global ‘goods’ - peoples, commodities, and money essential for the functioning 
of the capitalist system - and the reduction in risk of the circulation of global ‘bads’ - forced 
migration, trafficking, money laundering and so forth.39 Thus, when appearing before the US 
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2004, to report on the United States security 
environment, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby framed his submission in the very terms of the 
risks inhering within an enmeshed circulation globalised ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ noting that: 
‘[g]lobalization remains an overwhelming force that presents security challenges. Terrorists, 
proliferators of illicit weapons and military technology, narco-traffickers and alien smugglers 
are making increasing use of the world’s financial, communication and transportation 
systems’.40 
This period of reflection led to a reassessment of security priorities within western 
policy circles, exemplified by the claim in the United States Security Strategy, 2002, that 
‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones’.41 The 
empirical relationship between these islands of instability and transnational terrorism is 
contested.  Broadly speaking, three positions are discernible.  First, there are those studies 
finding evidence of a strong linear relationship, whereby the greater the intensity of state 
failure the more likely it is that the state will be the origin and target of transnational 
terrorism.42  Second, and contra this failed state thesis, others have argued that fragile states 
are preferred over failed states because they offer a more stable environment and an 
infrastructure that can be taken advantage of.43 Jettisoning these arguments framed, as they 
are,  in terms of ‘more’ or ‘less’ state failure, yet a third position claims that the ‘relationship is 
more complex than a simple linear causal process’.44   Such complexity, it is argued, indicates 
the need for more careful study in order to understand how certain ‘categories of weak and 
failing states’ are ‘associated with particular threats’ and how ‘additional variables … catalyse 
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an enabling environment into a genuine terrorist sanctuary’.45  Yet, despite this disputed link, 
fragile, weak and failed states’ association with international instability, transnational 
terrorism and criminality continues to remain the ‘conventional wisdom’.46  Accordingly, 
references to the dangers posed by weak and failed states are now ‘thoroughly mainstreamed’ 
within western states strategic documents.47 
A recent US National Security Strategy explicitly notes how ‘failing states’ continue to 
pose a ‘threat’ to the United States as they ‘breed conflict and endanger regional and global 
security’.48  Its National Strategy for Counterterrorism commits the US to ‘eliminate the 
safehavens’ relied upon by ‘Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates’ – ‘the physical sanctuary of 
ungoverned or poorly governed territories, where the absence of state control permits 
terrorists to travel, train and engage in plotting’.49   Similarly, the UK National Security 
Strategy 2010 notes that, ‘[f]ragile, failing and failed states around the world provide the 
environment for terrorists to operate as they look to exploit ungoverned or ill-governed space’ 
providing a ‘training ground’ for individuals with ambitions to commit attacks in the UK.50   
The European Union’s Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, 
affirms that ‘[s]tate failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most 
recently, piracy’ (European Union, 2008, p. 1) and its Draft Internal Security Strategy notes 
that, ‘[s]pecial attention will have to be paid to “weak and failed states” so that they do not 
become hubs of organised crime or terrorism’.51 
A similar link is made between Global Terrorism and poverty/inequality.  Just as the 
link between global terrorism and fragile/failed states is disputed, so too is the link between 
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terrorism and poverty/inequality. Various statistical studies investigating the terrorist life 
cycle and the root causes of participation in terrorism have failed to establish whether 
poverty and inequality create an environment that makes participation in terrorist acts more 
likely.52 James Piazza argues that there is ‘no empirical evidence to support the crux of the 
“rooted in-poverty thesis … that poor economic development, measured as low levels of per 
capita income, literacy, life expectancy, more equal distribution of wealth, growth of GDP, 
stable prices, employment opportunities, and food security, is related to increased levels of 
terrorism’.53  Moreover, other studies have found that democratic higher income countries 
actually have a higher incidence of terrorism and still others that, for countries with ‘similar 
levels of civil liberties, poor countries do not generate more terrorism than rich countries’.54 
Despite the disputed link between poverty/inequality and global terrorism, the rooted in 
poverty thesis has been  widely adopted, nevertheless - in a similar fashion to the failed state 
thesis - as a point of ‘consensus’ or ‘core assumption among national and policy makers since 
the events of September 11’.55  Indeed, in his Kennedy Memorial Lecture, the former Prime 
Minister of the UK, Gordon Brown deployed simultaneously both the failed state and rooted 
in poverty theses claiming that:  ‘now the worst threats come from states that are too weak’; 
that linked ‘to failed and failing states is the spread of international terrorism’, and; that the 
pool of disenfranchised serve as a ready recruiting ground for such groups so ‘that our 
enemy, as George Marshall put it in a great speech in Boston sixty years ago, will never be 
just one country but “hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos”’.56 
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The response to the risks perceived to be posed by fragile states and of terrorism has 
been driven less by the abstract principles of human rights and global justice and more by 
bricolage and incrementalism – combining existing policies and/or extending them to other 
issues.57  Rather than challenge neo-liberalism, the solution to such global risks has been to 
focus on state capacity and the basic welfare of the population to ensure its continuation.  
Instead of representing a shift away from what Beck calls ‘methodological nationalism’, the 
policy has entailed cooperation between international and national actors to ‘coproduce 
“sovereignty strategies”’ designed to restore the failing state to a condition whereby it can 
discharge effectively its sovereign responsibilities.58  At the same time, efforts have been 
directed towards development in order to improve the basic welfare of the population to 
further ensure stability. This securitization has involved the ‘reinvention of development as a 
form of conflict prevention’. 59  
 
 
The Evolution of Risk Governance: Intervention, Prevention and Extension 
 
This policy process has been constituted by three overlapping phases, or reflexive 
moments, since the end of the Cold War: intervention; prevention; and extension. The first 
phase began in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Freed from the constrictions 
of the bipolar world, the United Nations’ peacekeeping role shifted towards a more proactive 
stance, embracing peace-making, peace-enforcement and peace-building. There was also 
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recognition for longer term policies directed towards human development to prevent fragile 
states from collapsing altogether. The main strategy for preventing these disruptions to global 
circulation has been to induce state stability through enhancing human development (the 
securitization of development). As Duffield argues, the development-security nexus 
simultaneously has as its object not only the eradication of frictions for formal circulation, but 
also the containment of informal circulation such as unmanaged migration. 60  The 
perturbations of neo-liberal economic policies are seen as one of the factors in the shift from 
weak, to fragile states and their possible collapse.  Despite the fact that such links have not 
been firmly established, precaution indicated that such a policy be followed.61  The resulting 
securitization of development views human development as part of the solution to civil 
conflict, inducing state stability and eradicating the problem of these ungoverned spaces.62  
After 9/11, a third phase became apparent in which the securitization of development was 
extended to encompass terrorism. The precautionary principle was again in evidence during 
this phase. Fragile states were now viewed as possible safe havens from which terrorists 
could operate and poverty was regarded as one of many possible causes of terrorism. 
 
 
Intervention: Redefining Sovereignty 
 
Partly as a result of the increasing rise of islands of instability, the Dag Hammarskjöld 
framework of peace-keeping, previously limiting the role of UN blue helmets to a very 
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narrowly defined set of tasks, was radically reformed.  The Cold War had restricted the UN’s 
role to a mode of peace-keeping that relied upon the consent of the parties to the conflict and 
limited the use of armed force to one of self-defence.  But from 1992 onwards, there was a 
shift away from this ‘creative interpretation of Chapter VI’ (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) to 
a much more interventionist stance using economic sanctions and military force under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.63  The UN was now willing to engage in  deployments that 
were no longer conditional upon the consent of all parties, but could be sanctioned if ‘any 
party which feels threatened by aggression or by spill-over from nearby conflicts’ requested 
such action. 64  Such intervention thus involves both early deployments and confidence 
building measures in an attempt to avoid hostilities breaking out into conflict.65 Consequently, 
the limited notion of peace-keeping has been joined by a host of more expansive ‘peace-
operations’; including ‘peace-making’ (mediated conflict resolution) and ‘peace-enforcement’ 
(conflict resolution through economic sanctions/military intervention).66  As important for our 
purposes has been the introduction of post-conflict operations under the rubric of ‘peace-
building’.  This not only involves ‘mopping up’ operations such as mine clearance, but also 
institution building and the improvement of a state’s infrastructure in order to reduce the 
possibility of conflict from recurring. 67  The more proactive stance of peace-making, 
enforcement and building represent the triad of cornerstones of the new ‘integrated missions’ 
reflecting ‘a new international will to support the imposed or externally brokered peace deals 
that became more common from the mid-1990s’.68 
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In addition, the continual monitoring of events within countries with a focus on early 
warning and diplomacy has become increasingly important. Overall, it can be said, therefore, 
that the UN has shifted its emphasis to proactive political, social and economic initiatives 
aimed at nipping any problems in the bud by addressing the deeper long term difficulties 
besetting these countries.  As the First Report on the Prevention of Conflict stated in 2001, the 
emphasis should be on the ‘deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, 
institutional, political and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate 
symptoms of conflicts’; requiring solutions that encompass: ‘political, diplomatic, 
humanitarian, human rights, developmental, institutional and other measures taken by the 
international community, in cooperation with national and regional actors’.69 
Soon after (2005), the UN created a commission dedicated to the problem of fragile 
states and coordination of reconstruction efforts in the eventuality that such states collapse. 
The aim is to bring the various bodies of the UN to bear ‘on the reconstruction and 
institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the 
development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable 
development’.70 Significantly, the resolution calls upon the UN to work closely with the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and to ‘consult with civil society, nongovernmental 
organizations, including women’s organizations, and the private sector engaged in 
peacebuilding activities’.71  
Further to this, the World Bank and UN signed a Partnership Framework Agreement 
in October 2008, with the primary objective of enhancing ‘country resilience to crises, by 
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answering immediate needs and ensuring livelihoods of vulnerable populations, supporting 
sustainable peace-building and strengthening the capacity of national and local institutions 
for effective prevention, response and recovery leading to long term development’. 72  
Although the usual inter-institutional rivalry has not been absent, cooperation has occurred 
in Sierra Leone and Liberia. More recently, the World Bank pledged $1 billion in 
development aid in order to support the UN’s peace-building efforts in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The combination of ‘troops and dollars’ is now seen to be key to 
establishing stability in fragile states (The Economist, June 1, 2013).  Such initiatives seek to 
reduce the risk of state collapse and the instability that arises from such breakdowns and thus 
enhance not only the security of the state itself, but also ‘wider regional and global security’ 
by preventing the global ‘bads’ that would issue from such collapses.73 
Where sovereign independence with regard to territorial inviolability once held sway, 
selective intervention has become the norm.74  In order to contain the problems associated 
with these islands of instability, discourse and practice have shifted towards improving these 
states’ capabilities to monitor and control illegal activities within their own borders.  
Moreover, in situations which may lead to intra-state or intra-regional conflict, various 
international agencies attempt to reduce the possibility by stepping in both to provide 
economic assistance and diplomatic solutions but also the military wherewithal to thwart 
further disintegration.  This security governance of intervention goes beyond simply 
engaging in a state on a temporary basis.  It is recognised that complex emergencies involving 
intra-state conflict, infrastructural collapse, the resulting social dislocation and inability of the 
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state to provide basic necessities, also require security complexes – ‘linking state and non-
state actors, public and private organizations, military and civilian organisations’ – to restore 
order.75 
By promoting a shift from ‘governance by government to governance with 
government’ the principles of good governance are promoted within these security 
complexes without transgressing the IFIs founding principles.76 In addition, they seek to 
improve the legal superstructure and its implementation within governance states.77  The 
World Bank thus expanded its role to include ‘facilitating the communication of laws more 
effectively, ensuring the consistency of laws, updating legal systems, and training the 
judiciary’ and at the same time improving the execution of policy by ‘improving training and 
bureaucratic procedures, reforming the civil service…improving bureaucratic coordination 
and establishing a distinction between public office and private person’.78 
Although these practices blur considerably the distinction between the internal and 
external realms constitutive of modern sovereignty, the very purpose of such intervention, 
paradoxically, is for the various international and national actors to work cooperatively and 
collaboratively in order to ‘coproduce ‘sovereignty strategies’ designed to restore the failing 
state to a condition whereby it can discharge effectively its sovereign responsibilities.79  The 
emphasis in both discourse and practice on shared responsibility and co-production of 
sovereign involves the failing state consenting to participate in a corrective programme to 
‘close the sovereignty gap’. 80  and thereby produce the legitimate forms of responsible 
sovereign subjectivity associated with sovereign statehood in the early twenty first century.81  
 18 
In other words, these sovereignty practices are a technology of risk employed to reduce 
uncertainty and manage risk by ‘rendering states visible and predictable actors of a 
normalized international arena, that exercise ‘their’ sovereignty in a responsibly and 
disciplined manner’.82  In and of itself, the stabilisation of failed states through the discourses 
and practices of selective intervention are viewed as being insufficient, however.  As Duffield 
notes, for policy-makers, ‘[t]he pacification of post-interventionary society remains 
incomplete and contingent … whether there has been a decline in civil war or not, the risk of 
instability is real and immanent’. 83   The desire to prevent these immanent risks from 
emerging and the difficulties associated with doing so gives rise to ‘new challenges and 
opportunities to govern’ so that the risk dispositif connecting security, failed states and 
development continues to expand.84  The second of the overlapping phases of incremental 
expansion explored in this paper, below, is the securitization of development, whereby the 
stabilisation of fragile and failed states and the prevention of risks emerging is explicitly 
linked to human development. 
 
Prevention: Securitizing Development 
 
As a result of the ‘perturbations of neoliberal imposition’, there was a recognition that 
if the IFIs policies were to have any success in the least developed countries, then the 
problems of state breakdown, whether it be civil wars, resource wars, conflicts over 
ownership rights or the emaciating effect of informal economic networks, needed to be 
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confronted.85 These states thus became seen as islands of instability from which regional 
conflict, piracy, criminal and terrorist activities, ripple out into to the international system 
generating further chaos and instability.86  As Mary Kaldor puts it, ‘although most of these 
wars are localised, they involve a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction 
between internal and external…. or even between local and global, are difficult to sustain’.87 
As such, the World Bank viewed the problem as a ‘crisis of capability.  An urgent priority is 
to rebuild state effectiveness through an overhaul of public institutions, reassertion of the rule 
of law, and credible check on abuse of power’.88  For example, a recent World Development 
Report emphasises the importance of transforming institutions within these countries in 
order to ensure citizen security, justice and jobs. 89  The report recognises that state 
underfunding can have negative security implications not only through a reduction in 
capability, but also the possible involvement in informal economic networks – ensuring that 
‘the security and justice sectors are funded adequately and transparently is critical to stem the 
diversion of illegal revenues from natural resources or trafficking to the security forces’.90 Yet, 
while acknowledging that government programs may provide an initial ‘bridge’, the private 
sector is still viewed as the principal source of employment creation and the report 
emphasises the importance of producing a ‘business-friendly environment generating 
economic revival and setting the stage for broader reform’.91  From the perspective of the IFIs, 
the challenge is dealt with in terms of how to ensure a highly predatorial form of capitalism 
whilst still maintaining a satisfactory degree of stability within a country’s borders that will 
ensure the sustainability of the transformation underway.  In other words, the lack of what 
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Michael Mann labels infrastructural power – ‘the capacity of the state actually to penetrate 
civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm’ – has led 
to the embedding of various external actors within these states providing various capabilities 
which the state would otherwise struggle to supply.92 
The wider aim of this strategy is ‘to draw developing countries into regimes of global 
governance, which while they might have only uncertain developmental benefits, reflect the 
desire on the part of Western states to attempt to govern transnational flows and processes’.93  
This emphasis on transnational flows and circulation is not simply concerned with the 
’unblocking of log-jams, but more generically also with’…‘the problem of differentiating 
good circulation from bad circulation’.94  In order to achieve this, there has been a new 
emphasis on biopolitics, the ‘problems presented to governmental practice by the 
characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population’, at the global 
level under the rubric of human development.  The aim of which is to strengthen 
‘government in terms of the management of populations by systematically assaying their 
needs, composition, properties and dynamics in order to promote their welfare’.95 
The ‘lesson learnt’ is ‘not that neoliberal economic policy is damaging or contradictory, 
but that greater attention needs to be paid to the state as an “embedding agent” and the 
stability of the sovereign frontier’.96 As a result, the threats arising from the ‘ungoverned 
space’ of fragile states have led to the securitization of development.97 This securitization has 
involved the ‘reinvention of development as a form of conflict prevention’ which has, in turn, 
led to the ‘radicalization of developmental politics.  Indeed, it denotes a new commitment to 
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those strategies and forms of intervention that are geared to the direct attempt to transform 
whole societies, including the beliefs and attitudes of their members’.98  The new consensus 
can be understood as strengthening and extending the scope of permissible intervention in 
recipient countries. For not only is economic intervention justified on the basis of market 
imperfections but also the success of such interventions is attached to non-economic factors. 
In other words, the new consensus rationalises intervention by the donor agencies across as 
wide a remit as possible’.99 
The second phase of structural adjustment therefore entailed the embedding of 
capitalism, involving a shift from promoting a ‘reduction in the scope of state action’ to an 
emphasis upon the ‘nature of state action’.100  The IFIs became key agents in a broader ‘global 
regime of crisis management’ that emerged largely in response to the African crisis, such that 
they now concern themselves with ‘institutional capacity building; civil service (or more 
broadly public service) reform; the introduction of new forms of information technology, 
finance management and human resource management; technical assistance and the 
facilitation of public participation in policy monitoring, evaluation and development’.101 The 
degree of support in the 1990s reached new heights. For example, in Uganda, ‘NGOs 
contributed 64 per cent of the running costs of the health service’ and for Tanzania aid 
constituted 30 per cent of GDP’. 102  But, most significant is the qualitative change of 
governance whereby an array of external actors have become embedded within the very 
sinews of these states through the funding and influencing of ‘corporate plans within 
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ministries, departments and agencies – based on logical frameworks which set out specific 
policies, executing agencies, timeframes and funding requirements’.103 
By engaging through continual negotiations and enmeshing themselves within various 
ministries, donors have attempted to transform key personnel from simple power conveyors 
to active participants and purveyors of neo-liberalism. This has directed the construction not 
just of sovereign statehood but also of a particular model of liberal democratic government 
and state capacity ‘based on the principles of multi-party democracy, respect for human 
rights, and “good governance”, together with a view of the state as the essential manager of a 
regulated market economy, with responsibility notably for the legal order, the currency, and 
infrastructure, and for the provision of basic social services’.104  In order to bring this about, 
we now have integrated governance structures that are not only providing or, helping to 
provide, the functions traditionally thought to be the preserve of the sovereign state; these 
actors are guiding government policy through ‘a substantial and ongoing relationship’ so that 
state government and developmental governance have become inextricably entwined.105 
Historical inquiry testifies that insecurity, poverty and development have been 
habitually connected.  This notwithstanding, the crucial point here is not simply that 
‘development has long functioned as a liberal technology of security’, but rather to point to 
how the recent ‘rediscovery’ of the risks arising from poverty and inequality have prompted 
these specific and incremental adjustments – or reflexive moments - in policy discourse and 
practice, rather than a radical disjuncture, along the lines envisaged by Beck’s World Risk 
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Society thesis.  The final phase of incremental adjustment and bricolage to be explored is how 
the securitisation of development has been extended to incorporate terrorism. 106 
 
Extension: Development Governance and Terrorism 
 
The events of 9/11 prompted further development reforms by the highly industrialised 
countries which extended the trend towards the securitization of development. A year after 
the event Tony Blair stated, at the Labour Party Conference, ‘we need coalitions not just to 
deal with evil by force if necessary, but coalitions for peace, coalitions to tackle poverty, 
ignorance and disease.  A coalition to fight terrorism and a coalition to give Africa hope.  A 
coalition to re-build the nation of Afghanistan as strong as the coalition to defeat the 
Taliban’. 107  In this respect, the West acknowledged that, should they fail, ‘to build an 
economic and social system that satisfies enough of the needs of enough of the world’s people, 
then the terrorists will continue to recruit new allies as our old friends fall away or turn into 
enemies or cold, impassive neutrals’.108 In other words, the linkage between fragile and failed 
states, civil wars and global ‘bads’ was extended to include the new war on terror.109 
The link between poverty and terrorism is even more contested than that between 
failed/fragile states and terrorism.  For example, the OECD has long acknowledged the 
disputed link, noting that: ‘most poor countries do not experience terrorism, supply nor 
support terrorists’. 110  Similarly, in its Report on Terrorism and Development, RAND  
emphasise that ‘the link between terrorism and development … is by no means self-evident 
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… [and] a direct causal link between a lack of development and terrorism has yet to be 
proven empirically’.111  Yet, despite openly acknowledging this disputed link, the OECD 
argues that ‘it is nevertheless important to bring together efforts to fight poverty and 
terrorism’.112 Whilst RAND conclude that ‘[t]hese qualifications aside, there is a noteworthy 
potential for development policies to reduce the threat of terrorism’.113     
Elaborating its Development Co-operation Lens On Terrorism Prevention, the OECD 
explicitly notes how its strategy to combat terrorism extends its earlier strategic thinking on 
development and conflict prevention, more generally.114 From this perspective, terrorism is 
conceived of as a specific ‘form of violent conflict and conflict prevention is an integral part of 
the quest to reduce poverty’. 115   When stressing policies of prevention, precaution and 
knowledge are pivotal concepts because it is necessary to act at the earliest opportunity to 
avoid disastrous events occurring, but in so doing requires acting without ‘evidence to 
support our hunches’.116  Thus, concludes Michael Williams, ‘policy-makers operating within 
a risk–defined system will increasingly resort to precautionary polices to manage 
insecurity.117 
Such precaution had already prompted a revision in the management of debt 
repayments, even prior to contemporary concerns about global terrorism, thus reinforcing the 
way in which policy has developed by incrementalism and bricolage.  As early as 1996, 
reforms had been implemented following the announcement of debt relief via the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC).  At the time, 41 states that owed $221 billion were 
promised debt reduction, although the sustainability of debt was set at a level (250% debt to 
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exports ratio) that would still have left these countries saddled with heavy burdens.  The 
initiative also required the heavily indebted country concerned make a commitment from the 
outset to ‘“sound economic policies” – the IFIs’ usual euphemism for SAPs’.118  
Therefore, following the failure of the HIPC (only 3 countries had become eligible after 
two years), the enhanced HIPC initiative was announced as part of the World Bank’s 
Comprehensive Development Framework.  This time, the debt sustainability was set at 150% 
instead of 250% debt to export ratio.  Additionally, some countries immediately cancelled 
bilateral debt (UK, Sweden, Norway and Australia).  By 2002, $24 billion debt was cancelled 
for 26 countries. 
Furthermore, just as the UK was reeling from the July 7th terrorist attacks, the G8 
Gleneagles Summit concluded with the announcement of a total debt relief that could amount 
to a total of $55 billion.119 Moreover, there was a commitment to increase aid by $50 billion 
over the next five years with $25 billion promised specifically for Africa.120  At the time, the 
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, stressed how the ‘clear signal on Africa, not just of intent 
but of detailed propositions for help, stands in stark contrast to the politics of terror that we 
saw exhibited yesterday’.121 However, although this debt cancellation alongside promised 
increases in aid was significant (although many countries have failed to deliver on their 
stated targets), this does not get away from the fact that the overall aim of ensuring the 
continuation of neo-liberalism remains the underlying rationale.122 
This new form of loan conditionality chimes with the general evolution of developing 
states into governance states.123  The IMF and World Bank are one of an array of non-state 
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actors that advise, fund and monitor states’ activities. Developing states are given greater 
autonomy in establishing their economic development.  However, their choices remain 
narrowly confined to those that conform to the ‘scientific/technical’ economic policies 
prescribed by the ‘Knowledge Bank’. 124  The knowledge of the ‘Knowledge Bank’ thus 
continues to reflect and be limited by the imperatives of capitalism and securing free markets.  
In this regard, the less confrontational approach adopted by developing states may simply 
reflect the fact that ‘pro-reform elites have internalized international policy requirements and 
objectives’.125 
Once again, these incremental policy shifts do not constitute a radical rupture in the 
knowledge practices adopted by policy-makers in their endeavor to manage contemporary 
insecurities.  Instead, extending the securitization of development to incorporate terrorism is 
simply another phase in an ongoing process of bricolage whereby the prevailing governance 
discourse and practices linking fragile/failing states, poverty/inequality, and terrorism are 
mobilized and modified by western policy makers to order and manage the perceived risks of 
terrorism whilst reinforcing the authority of sovereignty and liberal (democratic) capitalism. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that the responses to the events of 9/11 and other terrorist 
attacks that followed, although significant, do not constitute a Beckian reflexive watershed. 
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Beck has argued that such shocks can serve as ‘an unprecedented resource for consensus and 
legitimation, nationally and internationally’, that such events can be ‘averted by political 
action’ and could lead to ‘the fundamental principles of modernity, including the free market 
principle and the nation-state order itself’ becoming ‘subject to the change, the existence of 
alternatives, and contingency’. 126  Such shocks are said to induce us ‘to make border-
transcending new beginnings’ towards a more cosmopolitan world. 127  However, a fully 
developed reflexive modernity depends ultimately upon decision-makers jettisoning tried 
and tested knowledge practices in their endeavours to manage contemporary insecurities.  
Knowledge is the pivotal concept because in an emerging risk society the modes of insecurity 
arising from our actions are unanticipated, unforeseen, unknown.128 The unenviable challenge 
for contemporary decision-makers is the unavoidable need to make decisions under these 
conditions of ‘radical uncertainty’.129  Illustrating the nature of the quandary for decision-
makers within a precautionary environment, Tony Blair has asked, ‘would you prefer us to 
act, even if it turns out to be wrong?  Or not to act and hope it’s OK?  And suppose we don’t 
act and the intelligence turns out to be right, how forgiving will people be?’.130  As Michael 
Williams neatly puts it, ‘[i]t is in making the decision to act on risk that the risk becomes 
risky’.131  In other words, there has been a palpable shift in policy-making, wherein the policy 
of prudence which ‘recommended what “precautions” to take under conditions of knowledge’ 
has been replaced by the precautionary principle which ‘demands that we act under scientific 
and causal uncertainty’.132  Nevertheless, however palpable, this shift has been incremental 
rather than paradigmatic.   
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Beck is under no illusions about the deleterious consequences of global liberal market 
economics, ‘imposed on indebted countries by the West’.133  However, it can be concluded 
from the foregoing analysis that Beck is too optimistic about the possibility that backlashes 
against the West are prompting the collapse of global free market ideology. 134   The 
implementation of neo-liberal reform may have been harmful for many states in the South, 
but it continues nevertheless, undermining Beck’s claim that such catastrophes lead to 
challenges to expert knowledge and to the rise of a cosmopolitan form of statehood that will 
tame global capital.  Indeed, interpreted from the perspective of World Risk Society, western 
security-development policies continue to be guided by ‘a non-reflexive rationality’, 
associated with the first phase of modernity, because they fail to recognise that the economic 
problems that they view as a partial cause of these global threats, arise from the fundamental 
economic structure of modern society itself.135   
Rather than witnessing a radical reconfiguration of the global economy, the reforms 
represent a further extension of the risk dispositif that has resulted in a strengthening of 
previous risk rationalities. The post 9/11 landscape has witnessed the expansion of the 
precautionary principle and the linking of security and development to encompass terrorism. 
Yet, the IFIs have continued to implement the rationality of liberal (democratic) capitalism.  
The politicised nature of the project has certainly been re-energised, but rather than lead to 
radical reform, it has instead prompted specific incremental reform comprising direct 
intervention by the West to secure these islands of instability from immediate chaos, the re-
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securing of territorial borders and limited development reform to prevent the emergence of 
further instability.   
Western governments’ responses to the recent crises in Libya and rise of Islamic State 
(IS) have continued to adhere to the established tenets of incremental reform in risk 
governance.  In keeping with their societies’ commitment to risk aversion and an overriding 
concern to avoid losses of blood and treasure of the kind incurred in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
western governments have ruled out, categorically, committing ground troops in any of these 
theatres and opted, instead, for more limited intervention at a distance, comprising no fly 
zones, aerial bombing campaigns, and drone attacks.  In making their cases for intervention 
western leaders have acknowledged the difficulties in making decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty and the need to learn from past mistakes.  However, when setting out his position 
for tacking the rise of IS before the United National General Assembly in 2014 UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron warned that ‘we must not be so frozen with fear that we don’t do 
anything at all’ and allow ‘past mistakes to become an excuse for indifference or inaction.136  
However, determining what these lessons are is uncertain.  President Obama was at pains to 
stress the need to take early precautionary action in order to avoid a humanitarian 
catastrophe in Benghazi and, following the victory of Libyan rebel forces, celebrate the 
humanitarian success of the operation.137   However, following Libya’s rapid collapse into 
chaos Alan J. Kuperman has noted how for Obama the lesson to be learned is ‘the need to 
come in full force’, whereas Kuperman’s own reading is that the US should have not 
intervened. 138   The point to be drawn for our purposes here is that western states appear to 
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have learned very little and, even faced with entrenched crises in Libya, Iraq, and Syria 
exceeding most commentators worst case scenarios, the reflex  remains to resort to tried and 
tested methods.  Consequently, the future for Beck’s ideas gaining policy traction among 
western governments is not bright; rather the future would seem to be further incrementalism 
and bricolage.   
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